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Lending is a risky enterprise because repayment of 
loans can seldom be fully guaranteed. The failure of a 
large number of state-sponsored agricultural develop-
ment banks in many developing countries was due, 
among other things, to their inability to ensure good 
repayment rates among their borrowers. In the context 
of providing credit to the rural asset-poor, what is 
being increasingly called for is institutional innovation 
that combines prudent banking principles with effect-
tive screening and monitoring strategies that are not 
based on physical collateral (such as land). One im-
portant innovation has been the formation of borrower 
groups and the use of group responsibility and peer 
monitoring as the core principles guiding financial 
transactions. The success story of Bangladesh's Gra-
meen Bank’s using small groups of borrowers in ser-
vicing the poor and achieving high rates of repayment 
is now well known. So are the experiences of SANSA 
in Sri Lanka and Credit Solidaire in Burkina Faso. In 
Thailand, the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural 
Cooperatives achieved high repayment rates even 
though it sometimes uses groups consisting of as many 
as 30 members. However, repayment rates are not uni-
formly high for all institutions or across groups within 
an institution. In Nepal, the repayment performance of 
groups formed under the Small Farmers Development 
Program (SFDP) exhibits a very mixed result. Exam-
ples from other countries show how repayment rates of 
groups can fluctuate according to changing external 
circumstances. 
 What important factors affect group repayment rates 
within these new financial institutions? What are fac-
tors that managers of microfinance should consider 
when initiating group formation? These are important 
issues for emerging microfinance institutions since 
even small amounts of loan losses can weaken a 
microfinance institution very quickly. IFPRI studies in 
Bangladesh and Madagascar address these issues. The 
results of these studies are summarized below. 
 
 
 Group size matters. The bigger the group, the more 
imperfect are flows of information likely to be between 
members, and repayment can falter because of poorer 
screening and monitoring. 
 Loan amount. Generally the bigger the loan 
amount, the more difficult it is to meet repayment obli-
gations in the event of project failure. Hence, unwilling 
default is likely to increase. 
 Group’s portfolio diversity. The greater the 
diversity of asset portfolio within group members, the 
less covariant the incomes within the group. This 
makes it easier for one member to bail out another 
member who is experiencing repayment difficulties. 
 Level of credit rationing. The higher the level of 
credit rationing imposed on the group, the higher level 
of the group’s unfulfilled credit demand. If this 
generates a greater concern for protecting future bor-
rowing privileges, groups can be expected to increase 
efforts to lower delinquency rates. However, if the 
degree of rationing is too high, it is likely to render the 
loan amount more and more trivial (in comparison to 
the needs of the groups), so that the lender may not be 
anymore considered as a preferred long-term partner. 
Hence, too much of rationing is likely to decrease in-
centives to adhere to the contracted repayment 
schedule.  
 Social interrelatedness within groups. Since infor-
mation flows are expected to be better within socially 
connected groups made up of friends and relatives, 
there would be less moral hazard associated with bail-
ing out a relative who is unable to meet the repayment 
requirements. However, cultural factors may turn im-
portant as when it becomes socially difficult to impose 
sanctions on relatives, and in this way dilute the 
enforcement process. For precisely this reason, to also 
prevent possible collusion, some credit programs have 
rules against groups consisting of close relatives. 
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 Demographic composition of group. Frequently, 
households with a greater number of nonworking chil-
dren and other dependents are perceived to be less 
creditworthy. Results indicate that this is not so: re-
payment rates in Bangladesh are better among groups 
made of households with more dependents. Indeed, it 
is likely that such households are more risk averse 
since the consequence of adverse shocks is likely to be 
more serious as it affects children and elders who are 
more vulnerable. Such risk-averse households would 
seek to avoid reduced borrowing privileges, or reduced 
access to special emergency funds in the future. Hence, 
they make special efforts to fulfill repayment obli-
gations. 
 Gender composition of groups. Findings in Bang-
ladesh show that repayment rates are higher for groups 
that have a higher percentage of women. Two factors 
may be at work. First, given that women have very 
limited experience in the market economy to begin 
with, they are extremely cautious in their business 
ventures and are likely to choose projects that are 
relatively less risky. Second, the cost of project failure 
is likely to be higher for females than for males, given 
pervasive gender inequities: project failure may lead to 
reprimand and significant negative sanctions against 
the woman within the household, and she takes 
account of this eventuality in her decisionmaking. 
Hence, women are not only likely to select less risky 
projects, they are also more careful about fulfilling 
repayment obligations. 
 Group formation. It is likely that screening and 
monitoring are more effective within groups that form 
on their own than within those groups that depend on 
the intervention of an outside agent. This leads to 
better repayment rates, except in cases when indi-
viduals collude to form groups with the express intent 
to default. 
 Community characteristics. The less remote and 
more buoyant the local economy, the better the market 
opportunities are for profitable enterprise. Hence re-
payment rates are better in such communities. How-
ever, IFPRI research indicates that this is not always 
so: in Bangladesh, remote communities had better 
repayment rates. The more remote the village, the 
greater the value placed on institutional credit services 
since other alternatives are less available (e.g., loans 
from traders, employers); delinquency rates therefore 
are low to avoid a loss of future borrowing privileges 




Overall, results indicate that once the right institu-
tional structures are in place, there need not be a major 
conflict between prudent financial management and 
lending to the asset poor. Repayment rates can be good 
even in relatively remote communities with higher 
than average rates of poverty. The secret seems to lie 
not just in innovations that reduce the cost of 
screening, monitoring, and enforcing loan contracts, 
but also in the successful demonstration to transactors 
in small rural communities that these innovations and 
institutions are not transitory phenomena, that they 
address their financial concerns, and that it is 
worthwhile for them to invest in a profitable long-term 
association. In fact, it is precisely this type of realiza-
tion among borrowers that has contributed to the 
building up of a critical mass of social capital that 
supports successful group-based institutions. Without 
this critical mass, joint liability would quickly floun-
der. Understanding the financial concerns of the poor 
is therefore indispensable; after all, there is little 
incentive for borrowers to build a lasting relationship 
with institutions that do not address their economic 
demand.  
 It is suggested that the process of group formation 
be made more endogenous to members themselves and 
less subject to external rules. IFPRI research indicates 
that factors such as asset and enterprise diversity 
within groups significantly affect repayment rates. A 
good mix of income activities, including agricultural 
production activities, is thus a desirable group char-
acteristic. In general, potential members are in a better 
position to screen and select the best partners for group 
formation, giving due consideration to factors such as 
potential risk-pooling benefits by co-selecting 
members whose anticipated income and consumption 
shocks are negatively correlated. 
 Finally, the experience of group lending shows that 
the basic principles of prudential banking have to be 
adhered to at all times. Delivering finance to the poor 
should not be taken to mean that loan evaluation or 
rationing should be entirely dispensed. On the con-
trary, loan size has to take into consideration in-
vestment capacities and the risk-bearing abilities of the 
rural poor. In fact, our analysis indicated that delin-
quency rates do appear to increase with loan size. 
Hence, objective and realistic project evaluation is 
necessary prior to loan approval. In case graduated 
lending is considered, increases in credit lines should 
be granted only after a careful scrutiny of project risks 
and conditional upon satisfactory previous repayment 
performance. However, it is important to ensure that 
this evaluation of loan applications not be based on 
traditional forms of bias against gender, age or families 
with many children. As the results of our analysis 
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